In early 2012, Chang’an Avenue was filled with tension
Everyone’s attention
was tightly seized by the political tsunami of Wang Lijun’s nighttime flight and Bo Xilai’s downfall
But very few people knew
that while people across the country were moving their stools
to watch this high-level “palace drama”
in the unseen deep waters of Zhongnanhai
a storm was rising
the largest counterintelligence purge
Within just two years, more than 30 deeply embedded operatives in China’s military core
core Party and government organs
and even the very heart of the Ministry of State Security
CIA senior informants
were precisely identified and then vanished without a trace
The New York Times’ major exposé and Foreign Policy’s in-depth investigation
cross-confirmed this extremely cold outcome
The U.S. intelligence community spent tens of billions of dollars
painstakingly built over 10 years
the China spy network was uprooted
About this heart-pounding covert war behind the red walls
because it involves too much information
many creators rely on a few second-hand pulp articles to speculate
making it look like a 007 movie
But real top-level rivalry
is never that black-and-white
To completely peel back this layer of fog
the Gousheng team dug into the most critical foreign intelligence archives of the past decade
from code-tracing reports of a top University of Toronto think tank
all the way to heavily redacted original FBI indictments
In this episode, we remove all fluff
and rely only on the most hardcore cross-verified sources
to reconstruct the most professional and shocking real great-power spy war online
Today Gousheng will take you to break open this red wall
and completely dissect this century-scale purge
People always think intelligence wars between great powers
must be like in 007 movies
with flawless plans and perfect execution
But when we peel back this façade with real records
you’ll find there’s nothing mysterious
When you truly see through this cold state machine
you’ll realize the world itself
is just a giant makeshift operation
Now let’s return to China in 2000
To understand how the CIA lost everything
you must first understand how they once dominated
In the intelligence world, China, Russia, and North Korea
have long been classified as top-level denial zones
with dense surveillance and strict control
foreign movement is heavily restricted
trying traditional 007-style espionage in China is extremely difficult
After the Soviet collapse, the CIA’s focus shifted east
By the early 21st century, China became the top priority
But China was not the Soviet Union
During the Cold War, the CIA relied on ideology
Look how brutal your Gulags are
Come see the beacon of the free world
Many KGB defectors carried a tragic pursuit of freedom
In the early 21st century after joining the WTO, China entered a boom era
and also an era of rampant corruption and rent-seeking
By then ideology had already been replaced by money
What lubricated this massive machine
was not ideology but real cash
Buying and selling positions
was not a secret in the system
but a semi-open hidden rule
In the military, local governments, and core ministries
there were clear price tags
for promotions
or which superior to bribe
insiders all knew
For example, during Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong’s era
everything had a price
There was even a saying
millions buy division posts, tens of millions buy army posts
In this system
if you didn’t bribe
you were seen as an outlier
a ticking time bomb
and would be sidelined for life
Facing such systemic decay
CIA analysts came up with an idea
They decided
to pay promotion bribes for recruited agents
Yes, you heard that right
In intelligence theory
there is a model called MICE
Money, ideology
coercion, ego
Facing these bureaucrats
the CIA understood the logic
You want promotion, you want into the PLA General Staff
you want into core think tanks
no problem
If you can’t pay the 2 million RMB bribe
the CIA will pay it
According to Zach Dorfman
who interviewed over 30
former US intelligence officials
the CIA saw this as long-term investment
A senior counterintelligence official said
The CIA also took care of these officials’ worries
Arranging overseas accounts for their wives
and covering tuition and living expenses for their children to attend Ivy League schools in Boston
According to The New York Times, senior-level informants could earn up to $1 million a year
This was both extremely generous compensation
and an irreversible pledge of loyalty
Once you take U.S. money to buy your position
and your son is driving a sports car in Los Angeles
do you think you can ever get off this pirate ship
Of course, the CIA isn’t stupid
They rarely recruit domestically
If they can’t reach you inside China, they wait until you go abroad
Chinese military officers travel to Djibouti, scientists attend conferences in Europe, officials visit the U.S.
Once outside the country and beyond the system’s protection, it becomes the CIA’s home field
The CIA even created an internal “Belt and Road” heat map
Wherever Chinese officials go, the CIA’s methods follow
Around 2010, this dollar-fueled corruption strategy
brought the CIA’s spy network in China to its absolute historical peak
According to four former U.S. officials speaking to The New York Times
the quality of high-level intelligence on China was the best in years
CIA informants were deeply embedded in the PLA’s core command system
key departments of the Communist Party
and even infiltrated the Ministry of State Security itself
It was the golden age of U.S. intelligence
Meetings held yesterday in Zhongnanhai, leadership intentions, military deployments
even personnel planning for the 18th Party Congress
could become top-secret briefings within days
and be placed on Obama’s Oval Office desk
Secretary Obama, we may need to approve more funding for China this time
The other side is asking for quite a lot because the position is reportedly very high
But we’ve already selected a reliable candidate
and he himself is also willing to contribute a bit
Alright, but this amount
the position offered must be worth it
Show me the list of candidates from yesterday’s internal meeting
It’s already on your desk, General Secretary
Are you sure it’s correct
Yes, it is
The secretary submitted these names from yesterday’s nominations
Is this the one
You mean our next General Secretary
After internal high-level discussions
we nominated someone named Donald Trump
He’s from northern Shaanxi, from a poor peasant family for three generations
and his father joined the Communist Party with Chairman Mao
Uh, I think I’ve heard of someone like that
Do you think I’m an idiot
Get out and find out
which idiot got into yesterday’s meeting
Time moves to the second half of 2010, when the winds shifted in Zhongnanhai
Senior officials in China’s Ministry of State Security began to sense a dangerous chill
Through surveillance and reviews of diplomatic interactions with the U.S.
they found that the Americans in major bilateral negotiations
high-tech export controls and even military decisions toward China
showed an eerie level of foresight
That precise grasp of China’s strategic cards
could not be achieved by satellites or intercepted emails
or a few low-level communications
Only those sitting in the meeting room
or those with access to internal briefings
could understand things so thoroughly
At the same time, China’s own intelligence network in the U.S.
began to be precisely dismantled
According to later cross-verified intelligence records
the Americans not only knew what we were thinking
they also knew who we had sent
The conclusion was unavoidable
there was a mole inside the Ministry of State Security and even the core system
This massive and secretive counterintelligence machine
immediately launched its highest-level internal investigation
The fuse that would trigger the earthquake
was finally ignited in early 2012
According to Reuters’ exclusive report
the MSS eventually locked onto a key target
an administrative secretary
to then Vice Minister Lu Zhongwei
Lu Zhongwei was a typical scholar-type intelligence official
who long oversaw the ministry’s core think tank
the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations
which provided top-level strategic reports to the Politburo
The vice minister himself may have been cautious
but his close secretary had extremely high access
He had access to large amounts of sensitive political, economic, and strategic intelligence
including top-secret overseas counterintelligence operations
Over several years
this secretary continuously passed core secrets to the CIA
directly leading to the exposure of multiple Chinese agents in the U.S.
Once this was discovered, the news went straight to the top
and shocked Beijing
Already shaken by the Wang Lijun incident
and leadership transition tensions
at this critical moment, the anti-spy agency itself
had been infiltrated like a sieve
This was not just an intelligence failure
but a political disaster of systemic collapse
In an ordinary government department
catching a corrupt official would be enough
But in intelligence, when even a vice minister’s office has CIA eyes
the most terrifying question arises
Was this mole acting alone
or part of a larger network
who in this compound could still be trusted
The arrest of the vice minister’s top secretary shattered all illusions among China’s leadership
They realized the CIA’s dollar-driven venture strategy
had already taken root too deeply
Faced with such systemic decay
the Ministry of State Security fell into extreme counterintelligence paranoia
Traditional internal reviews were no longer sufficient
and the system itself was not clean
For example, the associate of Guo Wengui
Ma Jian, then vice minister in charge of counterintelligence
was busy using surveillance to collect blackmail material on senior officials
while also helping Guo Wengui extort money from companies
The leadership knew clearly that to deal with a deeply infiltrated CIA network
relying solely on traditional surveillance and internal checks
was not only inefficient but risked leaks at any time
They had to bring in
an absolutely clean external force with overwhelming technical advantage
Thus the top leadership approved
the creation of a high-level joint task force
This task force
included elite officers from the MSS Counterintelligence Bureau
and also brought in China’s most secretive top cyber warfare unit
the PLA General Staff Third Department, later part of the Strategic Support Force
The Third Department is equivalent to China’s NSA
gathering the country’s top hackers
cryptographers and signals intelligence experts
This cross-department operation
fundamentally changed the nature of the counterintelligence war
from traditional mole-hunting
to a national-level cyber and signal tracking war
The joint task force reasoned
that with so many high-level officials recruited
the CIA would not be exchanging intelligence on park benches
To maintain such a large, high-frequency network
the CIA must have a covert electronic communication system
Once this system was found
they could trace it and expose all the spies taking U.S. money
Originally, finding such a system in the vast internet
was like searching for a needle in a haystack
But history played an absurd joke at this moment
At the time, to communicate with Chinese informants
CIA engineers
developed an internet-based covert platform
On the surface, these sites looked like normal news websites
Agents would type into a seemingly ordinary search bar
a specific code
to trigger a hidden message window
to communicate with handlers in Langley
Sounds high-tech
No no no
This system had two outrageously basic flaws
It was originally designed for the Middle East
such as Iraq and Afghanistan
where infrastructure was weak and conditions chaotic
But the CIA bureaucrats, to save time and money
copied the system directly into China
a country with the world’s strictest internet surveillance
At the time, CIA officers were overconfident
Their words were: don’t worry, no one can touch us
For security reasons, the CIA designed two systems
a provisional system for new recruits under evaluation
and a main system for vetted agents
In theory, the two should be fully isolated
However, the University of Toronto
Citizen Lab, a digital security research group
later found
that the CIA’s contractors
made a basic mistake
the two systems
were connected at the code level
FBI and NSA later tested it and cursed
oh boy
the CIA completely botched the firewall
Anyone accessing the outer system
could trace directly into the main system
It’s like building a billion-dollar bunker
but installing a small plastic pet door
and not even locking it
Ironically, it wasn’t China but Iran who first found this flaw
In 2009, Iranian intelligence
obtained a CIA communication site
Then Iranian cyber police did something
anyone with basic computer knowledge could do
They input HTML features, domain patterns
and SSL fingerprints into Google
Yes, Google
They uncovered
885 similar CIA front websites worldwide
These sites covered 29 languages and 36 countries
Even the shell companies behind them
used lazy naming and sequential IP addresses
some even linked back to CIA domains
Citizen Lab researchers
wrote in their report
even a motivated amateur
could map the entire CIA network
U.S. intelligence officials believed
that around 2009–2010
Iran shared this method
as a gift for the anti-U.S. united front, was generously shared with China’s Ministry of State Security
Just imagine
when MSS and PLA cyber warfare experts obtained this lead
how ecstatic they must have been
Once one person was confirmed as a CIA informant
they could trace login IPs and retrieve broadband registration data
lock the physical location and cross-check with surveillance cameras
and pull out everyone in the network
You build a multi-billion-dollar intelligence network
and it gets taken down by a Google advanced search
Arrogance is the deadliest poison in espionage
Not only was the tech flawed, CIA tradecraft was sloppy
According to former CIA officer Philip Giraldi
some CIA handlers in Beijing
met informants repeatedly in the same upscale restaurants
CIA agents in Beijing followed the same routes to the same locations
They seemed unaware
that after the 2008 Olympics
China’s surveillance system had been massively upgraded
A U.S. diplomat repeatedly appearing
in suspicious alleys
was basically exposed under big data surveillance
Giraldi pointed out the core issue
the KPI system
CIA promotions were based on numbers
how many agents recruited, how many reports produced
quality and security didn’t matter
because by the time problems surfaced, you’d already been promoted
With the technical breakthrough and mole list
the purge began from late 2010 to 2012
U.S. officials later described MSS operations as
relentless
They weren’t guessing
they were always arresting the right people
Once it started, the collapse was rapid
The tactics were sophisticated, like peeling an onion
They didn’t target top agents first
but started with low-level operatives
to verify intelligence methods
After arrest, they conducted secret interrogations
Early on, the CIA noticed some agents
began sending seemingly reliable intelligence
but with subtle inaccuracies
This meant MSS had turned them into double agents
forcing them to continue using the system to send false information
This stabilized the CIA
making them believe the network was still secure
while MSS mapped CIA methods and preferences
Each step confirmed added another piece
until the network was fully mapped
then MSS moved in
The methods became extremely harsh
The New York Times reported in 2017
citing three former U.S. officials
one shocking detail
an exposed informant was executed publicly
in front of colleagues as a warning
Personally, I find this detail unreliable
The New York Times
this kind of cartel-style execution
is extremely rare in China
High-level espionage cases are handled secretly
through closed trials
and rarely result in execution
even if executed, it’s done in designated locations
This public execution
was likely exaggerated
by terrified U.S. officials
watching agents disappear one by one
or based on internal warnings
used as deterrence
But the core fact is undeniable
According to Foreign Policy
in less than two years
around 30 CIA informants were executed or imprisoned
During those dark days
despair filled CIA headquarters in Langley
meetings were interrupted by calls
Sir, we lost another one in Beijing
According to Foreign Policy
at the final stage
the last CIA officer still operating
desperately handed out cash
hoping agents could bribe their way out
Some managed to escape
but for most, it was too late
U.S. intelligence on China collapsed
They’re about to find me
You’re our last informant, stay safe
We will find you, we will get you out
Hurry, they’re coming
Sir, your delivery has arrived
Leave it at the door
Hello, are you Mr. Spy? We have a loan offer
No
Hello, are you buying a house
No no
Everyone can find me except you
Wait, we’re still working on it
We found you, wait for me
No need to rescue me, they’ve already found me, take care of my family
Decades of effort vanished overnight
Washington had to find the cause
The FBI and CIA formed a top-secret joint task force codenamed Honey Badger
In a secret office in Northern Virginia
they stared at photos of missing personnel
the investigation fell into internal conflict and blame
System flaws alone could not explain
why some offline contacts were also exposed
because CIA information is compartmentalized
so the Honey Badger team identified the final factor
a mole
one of them was named Lee Zhencheng
Lee Zhencheng was Hong Kong-born and a U.S. citizen
he served 13 years as a core CIA operations officer with top clearance
fluent in Chinese and English
focused on East Asia and China
In 2007, he left due to a career ceiling
and moved to Hong Kong to start a consulting firm
but the business failed
a former agent with top secrets
ended up struggling in Hong Kong
his skills had no use in civilian life
for MSS to ignore him would be absurd
some U.S. officials suspected
his business opportunity was staged
as a trap
waiting until he left CIA protection
In April 2010, MSS officers approached him
offering $100,000 upfront
and promising lifelong support
Over three years, MSS gave him 21 task lists
he provided classified information
and received $840,000
In August 2012, during the peak purge
the FBI lured him back to the U.S.
and searched his luggage in Hawaii
The findings shocked the agents
they found handwritten notes and address books
listing names of CIA informants
and secret locations
clear evidence
but the shocking part was
the FBI didn’t arrest him
after five weak interrogations
he was released
because prosecution would expose damage
no one wanted that
it would destroy careers
Six years later, in 2018
he returned to New York
and was arrested at JFK Airport
He pleaded guilty in 2019
and was sentenced to 19 years
Why release him and wait six years
This reveals internal conflict
FBI believed there was a mole
but CIA official Mark Kelton
refused
due to past trauma
his colleague had been wrongly accused
and the real spy was FBI’s own
Robert Hanssen
Kelton opposed internal accusations
and demanded hard evidence
This was procedural justice
but also a fatal delay
FBI accused CIA
CIA accused FBI
the investigation stalled
The final conclusion
was multiple factors
moles, flaws, and poor tradecraft
a typical bureaucratic compromise
that diffused responsibility
In the investigation
FBI agent Charles McGonigal
later became a spy himself
taking Russian money
and leaking FBI information
He was imprisoned
Lee was not alone
many others
were also prosecuted
including Kevin Mallory
and others who worked for MSS
Mallory was a former CIA officer
who sold secrets in Shanghai
and was sentenced to 20 years
Ron Hansen took $800,000
and was sentenced to 10 years
Alexander Ma
leaked secrets in Hong Kong
and was recorded
counting cash
during the transaction
and the evidence was undeniable
he was sentenced accordingly
this pattern repeated
again and again
These cases exposed a brutal truth
and the coldest institutional flaw of the U.S. intelligence system
exit management was almost nonexistent
The CIA spends millions of dollars over years
to train someone into a dangerous intelligence asset
and then when they hit a career ceiling in their 40s
they are abandoned into the civilian market
When these former agents realize
their skills are useless outside espionage
when they face mounting bills and unpaid mortgages
when they see a LinkedIn message from a Chinese recruiter
with a $100,000 deposit
the outcome is almost inevitable
MSS can simply pick up a former spy with top clearance
If you think taking down 30 spies ended the story
you underestimate the system
The destruction of CIA’s network was only the first half
Now comes the second half
China began using big data
to redefine counterintelligence
After 2013, U.S. intelligence noticed a new capability
CIA agents with
perfect cover identities
traveled to Africa or Europe
but once they passed immigration
Chinese surveillance began
CIA agents were confused
My identity is fake, my background is fabricated
how could they know I’m CIA
The answer is big data
This leads to 2015
the OPM hack
According to U.S. claims
China obtained data on 21.5 million people
including government employees and families
including 5.6 million fingerprints
and SF-86 security forms
These 127-page forms record everything
mental health, affairs, debts, orientation
financial status
FBI Director Comey said
China now holds a database of everyone connected to government
At the same time, hackers accessed Marriott
500 million records
United Airlines and Anthem
and Equifax data
Imagine the combined power of this data
If someone named John
arrives with a diplomatic passport
data is checked instantly
John appears in State Department records
but not in OPM databases
missing entirely
Why missing
because CIA uses separate systems
big data reveals
any mismatch
is likely a CIA agent
Under big data
traditional spy methods
were crushed
into history
Former CIA analyst Gail Helt
recalled the panic
this affects everyone
anyone connected
it was terrifying
And more
the Snowden revelations
showed NSA surveillance
of Chinese systems
this shocked China
the internet
was weaponized
Combined with the purge
this accelerated cybersecurity
According to reports
China transformed its intelligence system
from data collection
to analysis
integrating language and data centers
into industrialized intelligence
before AI
now even more powerful
The impact extended beyond intelligence
it reshaped China’s security system
We mentioned Hu Jintao
who led the purge
with a pragmatic approach
focused on stability
avoiding crisis
After 2012, the Xi era began
counterintelligence became political
linked with anti-corruption and security doctrine
tightly integrated
First came restructuring
In 2014, Xi established the National Security Commission
Previously, MSS was under political-legal control
especially under Zhou Yongkang
in a subordinate role
The establishment of the National Security Commission centralized dispersed security powers
into the hands of the top leader
The MSS gained higher political status
In 2014, Zhou Yongkang, the former security chief
was investigated
one charge was leaking state secrets
In January 2015, Ma Jian
a former counterintelligence official
was sentenced to life for abusing power
Beijing MSS chief Liang Ke also fell
Personnel were reshuffled
In 2016, Chen Wenqing replaced Geng Huichang
Chen was a former discipline inspector
who handled major cases
signaling internal cleansing
to eliminate factional networks
and consolidate control
in the leader’s hands
Legal tools expanded
In 2014, a new Counter-Espionage Law replaced the old law
In 2017, the National Intelligence Law
In 2023, revisions expanded definitions
including data security
The MSS moved to the forefront
and into public messaging
In 2015, a reporting hotline
In 2017, rewards up to 500,000 RMB
In 2023, an official account
published its first article
calling for public mobilization
When CIA Director Burns
said networks were being rebuilt
MSS responded publicly
even posting a mocking article
about a CIA officer killed in China
implying a challenge
The covert war review is complete
If you think
the CIA is incompetent
that would be a mistake
Don’t mistake failure for weakness
Look at U.S. military capabilities
precision strikes
eliminating targets globally
this power remains
So why did it fail in Beijing
because reality is complex
this was a collision of two systems
Washington treated it as investment
focused on metrics
Beijing faced survival
a system under threat
When arrogance met survival
the outcome was inevitable
This was not moral
but survival
The most chilling part
is the people caught in between
whether officials
or agents like Lee
none mattered
they were expendable
no one cared
they were just numbers
in a system
The weak always suffer
in great power conflict
people are disposable
Elephants fight, grass suffers
I’m broke
rent, bills, credit cards
haven’t eaten
still can’t pay
What should I do
Finished the video
What video
I’m starving
Talking back now
I’ll report you
Maybe I won’t starve
Money is coming
Money money
Breaking news
A former journalist
has been arrested
with help from an informant
who received a reward
Everyone must report spies